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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 2002, the first group of detainees captured by the 
United States as part of its war on terror arrived at the U.S. Naval 
Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.1  In the years since, the base has 
housed nearly eight hundred detainees allegedly posing a threat to 
U.S. national security.2  Although detaining these individuals 
supposedly has advanced the United States’s security interests,3 critics 
consistently have lodged scathing attacks on the executive’s detention 
policies, variously labeling operations carried out at Guantánamo Bay 
as a “national disgrace,”4 a “grave mistake,”5 and an “embarrassing 
stain on the United States’ reputation.”6  Citing widespread incidents 
of improper detention, abuse, and even torture—all carried out 
under the guise of “enhanced interrogation techniques”7—groups 
 
 1  See Melissa A. Jamison, Detention of Juvenile Enemy Combatants at Guantanamo 
Bay: The Special Concerns of the Children, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 127, 130 (2005).  
 2  See Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo: The Case Against Preventative Detention, 87 
FOREIGN AFF. 9, 9 (2008).  
 3  See Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian 
and Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6, 9 
(2002) (“The U.S. government has defended its detention practices as necessary 
security measures.”); Steven Lee Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantánamo Open, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A16 (quoting then President George W. Bush as saying that, 
while he would “like to close Guantánamo,” he also “recognize[d] that we’re holding 
some people that are darn dangerous”).  
 4  Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) 
(“The Administration’s claims concerning a total absence of legal constraints on its 
actions at Guantánamo have become a national disgrace.”); Ben Wizner, 
Guantánamo: The Road to Closure, ACLU (July 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/2007 
/07/26/guantanamo-the-road-to-closure/ (“We’re now in the sixth year of the 
national disgrace that may one day be remembered as the Guantanamo Era.”).  
 5  Carol Rosenberg, Detentions at Guantánamo Bay ‘Grave Mistake,’ Lawmakers Say, 
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2004, at 14.   
 6  Roth, supra note 2, at  9; see also Darrel J. Vandeveld, I Was Slow to Recognize the 
Stain of Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/14 
/AR2009011402319.html.  Before resigning, Vandeveld, a former lieutenant colonel 
in the U.S. Army Reserve, worked as a prosecutor in the Office of Military 
Commissions at Guantánamo Bay.  Id.  
 7  See Exec. Order No. 13,440, Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions 
Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation 
Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, 72 Fed. Reg. 40707 (July 24, 2007) 
available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-3656.pdf (stating that the 
practices that became known as enhanced interrogation techniques were in full 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S 
MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S 
USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 70–82 
(2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT] (detailing the Office of 
Legal Counsel’s advice regarding interrogation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay), 
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such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Amnesty 
International, and the International Red Cross launched campaigns 
to influence public opinion and prompt judicial intervention into the 
war effort.8  Ultimately, these battles were waged in an attempt to 
shape the government’s detention policies, and from at least one 
perspective, they were widely successful.  Enhanced interrogation 
techniques have been banned by executive order9 and, as a result of 
litigation largely furthered by civil liberties groups,10 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has granted an increasing number of rights to 
Guantánamo detainees.11 
But while these developments have been hailed as victories by 
civil libertarians, they have not come without significant cost.  With 
increasing frequency, journalists and scholars have begun to 
document the marked expansion in the government’s use of drones 
to kill targets who purportedly pose a threat to U.S. national 
security.12  Though a few observers have intimated that there may be a 
 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/oprfinalreport090729.pdf. 
 8  See Mika C. Morse, Honor or Betrayal?: The Ethics of Government Lawyer-
Whistleblowers, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 427–28 (2010) (explaining that details of 
the government’s use of “waterboarding, sleep deprivation, isolation, and physical 
violence on the detainees” were exposed after “groups such as the ACLU pushed 
forward [Freedom of Information Act] requests”); AMNESTY INT’L, GUANTÁNAMO: A 
DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 12–18 (2011), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/103/2011/en (chronicling 
numerous accounts of detainees alleged or found by courts to have been held 
improperly); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2004, at A1 (explaining that the “International Committee of the Red Cross 
has charged . . . that the American military has intentionally used psychological and 
sometimes physical coercion ‘tantamount to torture’ on prisoners at Guantánamo 
Bay”). 
 9  See Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 
(Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf 
(revoking executive order 13,440, see 72 Fed. Reg. 40707, supra note 7, and directing 
U.S. personnel to refrain from engaging in enhanced interrogation techniques); 
Peter M. Shane, The Obama Administration and the Prospects for a Democratic Presidency in 
a Post-9/11 World, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 27, 33 (2011) (noting that executive order 
13,491, signed by President Barack Obama, “renounced all legal guidance regarding 
interrogation rendered between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009”). 
 10  See, e.g., Peyton Cooke, Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism 
and Intelligence Under the Laws of War, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 601, 607–08 (2010) (noting 
that the Center for Constitutional Rights “has been involved in almost every 
significant aspect of Guantánamo litigation . . . and boasts having filed the first case 
on behalf of detainees at Guantánamo”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
 11  See infra Part III.C.1.  
 12  See John Yoo, Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
57, 61 (2011) (“Despite its campaign criticism of Bush’s approach to the war, the 
Obama administration has accelerated the use of drones.”); Helene Cooper & Mark 
Landler, Targeted Killing is New U.S. Focus in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at 
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causal connection between the increase in targeted killing and the 
growing dearth of unfettered detention options,13 the actual link 
between these phenomena has not been thoroughly explored. 
This Article fills that gap.  Examining the connection between 
the government’s detention and targeted killing policies, this Article 
argues that attempts to remove the “stain” of Guantánamo Bay have 
created what might be an even greater crisis.  Specifically, while civil 
libertarians have claimed success in executive and judicial efforts to 
grant detainees greater protections, this success has produced an 
unintended incentive for the government to kill rather than capture 
individuals involved in the war on terror.  This perverse outcome has 
occurred not as a result of a foreseeable linear process whereby one 
phenomenon caused the other, but rather as an unanticipated 
reaction to changes thrust into the nonlinear dynamic systems14 of 
warfare and national security law.15 
 
A1; Christopher Drew, Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2010, at A6; Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Revenge of the Drones: An 
Analysis of Drone Strikes in Pakistan, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_of_the_drones (“Obama, 
far from curtailing the drone program he inherited from President George W. Bush, 
has instead dramatically increased the number of U.S. Predator and Reaper drone 
strikes.”).   
 13  See Hillel Ofek, The Tortured Logic of Obama’s Drone War, 27 NEW ATLANTIS 35, 
37 (2010) (“[P]erhaps the [Obama] administration’s opposition to Guantánamo and 
to enhanced interrogation has led it to see even more clearly the convenience of 
taking the fight to the enemies’ homes and hideouts and killing them before they 
come within the purview of the U.S. justice system.”); Karen DeYoung & Joby 
Warrick, Under Obama, More Targeted Killings than Captures in Counterterrorism Efforts, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at A01 (noting that the Obama Administration “has 
escalated U.S. attacks on the leadership of al-Qaeda” given that “options for where to 
keep U.S. captives have dwindled”). 
 14  Dynamic systems are those with properties changing over time, while 
nonlinear systems are those wherein “the system components’ relationships are 
nonproportional (e.g., as x increases, y increases at a varying rate).”  J.B. Ruhl, 
Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call 
for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 854 n.5 
(1996) [hereinafter Complexity Theory as a Paradigm] (citing PETER COVENEY & ROGER 
HIGHFIELD, THE ARROW OF TIME 184 (1990)).  These principles are discussed in 
greater detail in Part II.  
 15  Since September 11th, scholars have explored many examples of apparently 
unforeseen results flowing from legal issues surrounding the war on terror.  See, e.g., 
PETER W. GALBRAITH, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: HOW WAR IN IRAQ STRENGTHENED 
AMERICA’S ENEMIES (2008); Victor C. Johnson, Immigration Policy and International 
Students: A Threat to National Security, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 25, 25 (2004) 
(arguing that “well[-] intentioned actions” taken in response to September 11th will, 
in fact, have the deleterious effect of hindering international scholarly exchanges 
previously seen as an “investment in foreign policy”); Danica Curavic, Note, 
Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy?: The Unintended 
Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions, 43 CORNELL 
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To uncover the relationship between the government’s 
detention and targeted killing programs, this Article invokes the 
insights of complex adaptive systems theory.16  While scholars have 
employed chaos and complexity theory to examine legal issues for 
some time,17 the more nuanced theory of complex adaptive systems is 
a relative newcomer.18  Nevertheless, scholars are increasingly making 
the case that the theory offers a useful means by which to understand 
the legal system and the effects that flow from changes introduced 
thereto.19 
This Article explains and builds upon that work by arguing that 
legal policies regulating the war on terror actually implicate two 
 
INT’L L.J. 381, 384 (2010) (“Rather than providing a new weapon against terrorism or 
a means to compensate victims of terrorist acts, the FSIA’s terrorism exception 
aggravates already strained relations between the United States and foreign nations 
that have historically sponsored terrorism directly or indirectly.”); GEORGETOWN 
UNIV. LAW CTR., HUMAN RIGHTS INST., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS 
OF THE WAR ON TERROR i (May 2006), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown 
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hri_papers (suggesting that material 
support laws passed after 9/11 have “led to over-inclusive and irrational results 
antithetical to [their] purpose”).  Though a thorough examination of each of these 
examples is beyond the scope of this Article, they serve as further evidence that the 
complexity inherent within the legal system makes it difficult to anticipate the 
precise results of introducing changes therein. 
 16  See J. B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008) 
[hereinafter Law’s Complexity]. 
 17  See, e.g., Lawrence Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The 
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 
(1994) (explaining how chaos theory can inform the development of securities and 
corporate law); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 425 (1994) (proposing that chaos theory can aid in the study of 
legislation); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of the Laws: The 
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 
(1997) (arguing that computational complexity theory provides a means by which to 
understand the complexity of the legal system); David G. Post & David R. Johnson, 
“Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-
Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (positing that complexity 
theory has important implications for legal theory, especially in the area of Internet 
regulation). 
 18  See Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as 
Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369, 
371 (2007) [hereinafter Telecommunications Economy] (arguing that “if the 
telecommunications sector and the legal/policymaking institutions are viewed as 
coevolving and complex adaptive systems, then there are important implications for 
regulatory policy”); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and 
Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 913 (2005) (exploring the extent to which 
properties of complex adaptive systems theory “may add value as a matter of positive 
analysis to the understanding of change within legal systems”); Jeffrey G. Miller, 
Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REV. 409 
(2000).  
 19  See, e.g., Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 888. 
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systems—that of both warfare and law.  Because these two systems 
“interact complexly with each other, as well as with all . . . other 
complex social and physical systems with which they are 
interconnected,”20 introducing even small changes into either of 
these complex adaptive systems can generate dramatic effects that are 
unforeseeable when the intervention initially is introduced.21  Within 
the context of the war on terror, altering detainee policies may have 
led to the unintended consequence of encouraging the government 
to dismiss the option of capturing high-value targets in favor of simply 
eliminating them with drones.22  This important insight suggests a 
broader one: thinking of war and national security law as interrelated 
complex adaptive systems can help policymakers, lawmakers, and 
judges gain a better appreciation of the practical consequences of 
their decision-making processes. 
To make these arguments, the Article proceeds as follows.  Part 
II introduces the theory of complex adaptive systems and explains 
that law and war both exhibit properties of these systems.  Part III 
provides a summary of significant post-9/11 legal developments 
related to war on terror detentions and interrogations, and describes 
how these developments gradually increased the protections afforded 
to detainees.  Part IV argues that these efforts to protect the civil 
liberties of detainees may actually have had the perverse effect of 
encouraging targeted killing.  More specifically, using complex 
adaptive systems theory, Part IV argues that the rise of the drone may 
be evidence of the adaptive and self-organizing properties inherent 
within the systems of law and war.  Part V concludes that the 
government’s expanded use of drones is representative of an 
unexpected and unintended consequence that can arise as a result of 
human intervention into complex adaptive systems. 
 
 20  Id.  
 21  The notion that small changes to the status quo can lead to drastic effects has 
been termed, in chaos theory, “the butterfly effect.”  KYLE KIRKLAND, PHYSICAL 
SCIENCES: NOTABLE RESEARCH AND DISCOVERIES 116 (2010).  “The butterfly effect 
refers to the notion that the tiny perturbations caused by the flapping of a butterfly’s 
wings in South America, for example, could lead to tremendous consequences in the 
atmosphere, perhaps instigating a tornado in the United States.”  Id.  For an example 
of the application of this phenomenon in the legal system, see Derek W. Black, 
Accounting for Historical Forces in the Effort to Align Law with Science, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1151, 1161–62 (2010) (discussing the butterfly effect in the context of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence). 
 22  The law of unintended consequences suggests that well-intentioned efforts to 
attain a specific goal may actually produce results antithetical to the hoped for effect.  
See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 851, 862 (1996). 
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II.  COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THEORY, WAR, AND THE LAW 
In the late 1980s, Professor Laurence Tribe, while discussing the 
need for a “revision” in constitutional jurisprudence, explained that 
“the metaphors and intuitions that guide physicists can enrich our 
comprehension of social and legal issues.”23  Since then, numerous 
legal scholars have used these “metaphors and intuitions” as a lens 
through which to examine various aspects of the law.  Nowhere is this 
more evident, perhaps, than in the growing body of scholarship 
utilizing complexity theory as a means of improving the legal system.24 
One strand of this scholarship has focused on complex adaptive 
systems theory and its ability “to expand our understanding of [the 
legal system’s] behavior and properties.”25  Emerging from the more 
general framework of complexity theory, complex adaptive systems 
theory developed amidst efforts by scientists to understand precisely 
what makes behavior within complex systems so difficult to 
understand and predict.26  The theory postulates that the answer to 
this mystery rests, in part, on the fact that complex systems have the 
ability to adapt, and that adaptation itself exacerbates the complexity 
inherent within already complex systems.27  Or, as one pioneer in 
complexity science explains, adaptation “gives rise to a kind of 
complexity that greatly hinders our attempts to solve some of the 
most important problems currently posed by our world.”28 
This has not, of course, prevented scientists and scholars from 
trying to identify some degree of order and coherence within 
complex adaptive systems.  Indeed, application of the theory has led 
to useful discoveries in various fields of study, from economics and 
environmental sciences, to medicine and neuroscience.29  As noted, 
however, complex adaptive systems theory has only recently been 
 
 23  Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1989). 
 24  See Gregory Todd Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a Complex System, 24 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 878–80 (2008) (citing numerous scholarly works applying 
systems theory to issues in criminal law, law and economics, mediation, 
environmental law, constitutional law, business law, administrative law, and so forth). 
 25  Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 888. 
 26  See JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 
xviii (1995) [hereinafter HIDDEN ORDER].   
 27  Id. at xviii, 6–10. 
 28  Id. at xviii.   
 29  See, e.g., JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 2 (1998) 
[hereinafter EMERGENCE]; Paul Bourgine, What is Cognitive Economics, in COGNITIVE 
ECONOMICS 1, 6 (2004); Simon A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex 
Adaptive Systems, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 431, 431 (Paul Bourgine & Jean-Pierre Nadal 
eds.,1998); Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 887 n.11. 
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imported into legal studies.30  With that in mind, this Part provides a 
basic introduction to the theory and explains its utility in thinking 
about warfare and the law as interdependent complex adaptive 
systems.  This understanding will serve as the foundation for later 
portions of the Article exploring the connection between the 
government’s detention policies and the rise in targeted killing. 
A.  The Theory of Complex Adaptive Systems 
Until the middle of the twentieth-century, Newtonian physics 
dominated scientific efforts to explain and predict various events 
taking place in the natural world.31  Based largely on the notion that 
physical laws dictated “a neat correspondence between cause and 
effect,” the Newtonian paradigm led scientists to believe “that they 
could reduce even the most complex behavior to the interactions of a 
few simple laws and then calculate the exact behavior of any physical 
system into the future.”32  This conviction rested largely on the theory 
that the world was made up of “linear systems”—systems displaying 
linear causality, such that “effect is always directly proportional to 
cause.”33  Given the apparent simplistic properties of these systems, 
scientists operated within a reductionist framework, believing that 
systems could best be understood by reducing them to their 
component parts.34 
Gradually, however, because systems often did not operate in the 
manner Newtonian physics would predict, scientists began to 
question traditional assumptions about the laws of nature.35  In 
particular, theorists gained a new appreciation for nature’s random 
properties and unpredicted responses.36  This was most evident in 
their recognition that, when introducing various stimuli into systems, 
“infinitesimal change[s] in initial conditions could have a profound 
effect on the evolution of [an] entire system.”37  In other words, 
contrary to previous beliefs, systems often did not actually exhibit 
linear and proportional causality.  The laws of nature suddenly 
 
 30  See supra note 18 and accompanying text.   
 31  David H. Freedman, Is Management Still a Science?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 1992, 
at 26, 28–29.   
 32  Id. at 29. 
 33  ALAN RANDALL, RISK AND PRECAUTION 65 (2011). 
 34  See DAVID KERNICK, COMPLEXITY AND HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATION: A VIEW FROM 
THE STREET 8 (2004).   
 35  Freedman, supra note 31, at 30.   
 36  Id.   
 37  Id.   
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appeared instead to be “as random as a throw of the dice.”38 
These observations gave rise to a new discipline called chaos 
theory.  In common parlance, the term “chaos” suggests a state of 
disorder.  As used by scientists, however, “chaos” refers to the fact 
that systems within the universe are complex and—though 
structured—susceptible to highly unpredictable behavior.39  The basic 
premise of chaos theory is that chaos is really “order masquerading as 
randomness,”40 a precept based on the observation “that patterns . . . 
lurk beneath the seemingly random behavior of these systems.”41  To 
gain a deeper understanding of these patterns, theorists had to 
“mov[e] away from linear, reductionist, simple cause-effect models” 
grounded in Newtonian physics, and toward models confronting the 
newly discovered chaos and complexity within many of nature’s 
systems.42  One model designed to do just that is the theory of 
complex adaptive systems. 
Owing perhaps to their recent recognition by scientists,43 there is 
no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a complex 
adaptive system.  Most simply, theorists have described them as 
“systems that have a large number of components, often called 
agents, [which] interact and adapt or learn.”44  While this definition is 
somewhat helpful in broadly framing the discussion, complex 
adaptive systems are best understood by examining their properties. 
Accordingly, those most important for the current discussion are 
explored in detail below.45 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  KERSTIN PILZ, MAPPING COMPLEXITY: LITERATURE AND SCIENCE IN THE WORKS OF 
ITALO CALVINO 150 (2005). 
 40  JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS 22 (1987). 
 41  Freedman, supra note 31, at 30. 
 42  Jerome L. Singer, Mental Processes and Brain Architecture: Confronting the Complex 
Adaptive Systems of Human Thought (An Overview), in THE MIND, THE BRAIN, AND 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 1 (Harold J. Morowitz & Jerome L. Singer eds., 1994). 
 43  See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE xvii (2007) (“[R]esearch in 
the area of complex adaptive systems is still in its formative stages . . . .”). 
 44  John H. Holland, Studying Complex Adaptive Systems, 19 J. SYST. SCI. & 
COMPLEXITY 1, 1 (2006); see also JAMES S. TREFIL, 101 THINGS YOU DON’T KNOW ABOUT 
SCIENCE AND NO ONE ELSE DOES EITHER 42 (1996) (explaining that complex adaptive 
systems are those having “many different parts, each of which can change and 
interact with all the others, and one[s] that as a whole can respond to [their] 
environment”). 
 45  Admittedly, to the extent these sections give the appearance that the featured 
properties are not interrelated, they are somewhat arbitrarily organized.  This 
structure should enable the reader, however, to gain a general understanding of 
these properties. 
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1.  Complexity 
One of the most prominent features of complex adaptive 
systems is their very complexity.  As used in this context, complexity 
refers not to the level of complication,46 but instead to the fact, as 
previously noted, that these systems are composed of numerous 
interconnected components, or agents, dynamically interacting with 
one another, as well as with other external systems.47  Because 
scientists “tend to focus on parts of a system,” they initially assumed 
that complex systems could “be broken down into a number of 
smaller units [that could] be managed independently.”48  As 
complexity science developed, however, this reductionism was 
rejected; scientists began to understand that “system behavior cannot 
be understood by decomposing the system into parts,”49 because “the 
actions of any single part of the system can only be understood with 
reference to the entire system.”50  Reductionism, therefore, gave way 
to holism which, while “accept[ing] that a whole is constructed out of 
many smaller parts, . . . considers that those smaller parts create, via 
interaction, more than the sum of the separate parts.”51 
The complexity inherent in complex systems is compounded by 
a principle known as “nesting.”  Nesting is a term used to describe the 
fact that “[t]he components of a complex system may themselves be 
complex systems.  For example, an economy is made up of 
organizations, which are made up of people, which are made up of 
cells—all of which are complex systems.”52  Given that these systems 
are embedded within each other, changes to the subsystems—or even 
the agents within them—can significantly alter the entire system.53  In 
other words, the inherent interconnectivity and dynamism within 
 
 46  SANDRA C. DUHÉ, NEW MEDIA AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 59 (2007). 
 47  See J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to 
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 
948–49 (1997) [hereinafter Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System]. 
 48  Michael Lyons, Insights from Complexity: Organizational Change and Systems 
Modelling, in SYSTEMS MODELLING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 31 (Michael Pidd ed., 
2004) (emphasis added). 
 49  Telecommunications Economy, supra note 18, at 380. 
 50  Glenn D, Walter, Crime and Chaos: Applying Nonlinear Dynamic Principles to 
Problems in Criminology, 43 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 134, 136 
(1999). 
 51  WALTER R. J. BAETS, COMPLEXITY, LEARNING AND ORGANIZATIONS: A QUANTUM 
INTERPRETATION OF BUSINESS 20 (2006). 
 52  RANDALL, supra note 33, at 65. 
 53  JANIE B. BUTTS & KAREN L. RICH, PHILOSOPHIES AND THEORIES FOR ADVANCED 
NURSING PRACTICE 128 (2011). 
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complex adaptive systems make it difficult to understand the impact 
that intervention in one part of the system will have on other parts.54 
2.  Nonlinearity and Emergence 
The complexity in complex adaptive systems is exacerbated by 
the fact that these systems are not governed by linear causality.  As 
noted previously, “the linear cause and effect model of Newtonian 
physics” historically dominated scientific theory.55  In linear systems, 
intervention within a system generally has easily measurable and 
predictable results.  Gravity is a prime example—dropping an object 
from some height will necessarily produce the effect of causing the 
object to fall.  On the other hand, “complex adaptive systems are 
characterized by inseparable components that can produce 
counterintuitive results, [and] provide ambiguous and distant links 
between cause and effect.”56  This phenomenon is a result of the 
“nonlinearity” present in complex systems, a principle describing the 
fact that “the system components’ relationships are 
nonproportional.”57  Accordingly, “large changes in input may lead to 
small changes in outcome, and small changes in input may lead to 
large changes in outcome.”58  This aspect of complex adaptive systems 
makes it such that the “most useful scientific tools for generalizing 
observations into theory—trend analysis, determination of equilibria, 
sample means, and so on—are badly blunted.”59 
A related principle is that complex adaptive systems are 
especially likely to display emergent behavior.60  Emergence has been 
“described as the outcome of collective [behavior], i.e. interactions 
among agents (elements, individuals, etc.) performing something 
individually, or together, which creates some kind of pattern or 
[behavior] which the agents themselves cannot produce.”61  The 
 
 54  This phenomenon explains why complex adaptive systems theory has found 
great resonance amongst environmental scientists.  It has long been recognized that 
deleterious impacts on the environment have far more than local consequences. 
 55  JEROME S. BERNSTEIN, LIVING IN THE BORDERLAND: THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CHALLENGE OF HEALING TRAUMA 48 (2005).   
 56  DUHÉ, supra note 46, at 89. 
 57  Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 14, at 854 n.5. 
 58  Giovanna Bimonte, Predictability of SOC Systems: Technological Extreme Events, in 
DECISION THEORY AND CHOICES: A COMPLEXITY APPROACH 223 (Marisa Faggini & 
Concetto Paolo Vinci eds., 2010). 
 59  HIDDEN ORDER, supra note 26, at 5. 
 60  See EMERGENCE, supra note 29, at 184. 
 61  Fredrik Nilsson & Vince Darley, On Complex Adaptive Systems and Agent-Based 
Modelling for Improving Decision-Making in Manufacturing and Logistics Settings, 26 INT’L 
J. OPERATIONS & PROD. MGMT. 1351, 1354 (2006).   
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property of emergence within complex adaptive systems makes it 
difficult to ascertain the cause of various effects, because “individual, 
localized behavior aggregates into global behavior that is, in some 
sense, disconnected from its origins.”62 
3.  Adaptability, Evolution, and Self-Organization 
The observation that complex adaptive systems display emergent 
phenomena is connected to the understanding, inherent in the 
lexicon of complex adaptive systems studies, that complex systems 
exhibit patterns of adaptation.  In other words, these systems, as well 
as the agents within them, are constantly changing in response to 
information they gather about themselves and their surroundings.63  
“Complex adaptive systems learn as a natural part of their ability to 
meet changes in their landscapes.”64  With this in mind, some 
observers have even gone so far as to say these systems have “a life of 
their own,” in that “they evolve in unpredictable and novel ways.”65 
This raises the question of precisely what these systems are 
evolving toward.  The simple answer to this question is that the agents 
within systems, and even the systems themselves, constantly trend 
toward what theorists term self-organization.66  Self-organization “may 
be regarded as a theory about the way chaotic systems organize 
themselves and attain order.”67  Self-organization is evident, for 
example, in the processes whereby “[m]arketplaces respond to 
changing technological development, changing lifestyles and 
preferences, immigration and the price of raw materials.”68  Self-
organizing behavior is also exhibited when “[n]ational states build 
new alliances” or when species evolve “to survive better in a changing 
environment.”69  Simply put, self-organization is the process whereby 
 
 62  MILLER & PAGE, supra note 43, at 44. 
 63  Murray Gell-Mann, Complex Adaptive Systems, in THE MIND, THE BRAIN, AND 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 11, 12 (Harold J. Morowitz & Jerome L. Singer 
eds.,1994).  While this change generally is supposed to be advantageous, Gell-Mann 
notes that it can, in fact, lead to the development of maladaptive behaviors.  See id. at 
16–17. 
 64  JAMES HITE, JR., LEARNING IN CHAOS: IMPROVING HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN 
TODAY’S FAST-CHANGING, VOLATILE ORGANIZATIONS 108 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 65  RALPH D. STACEY, COMPLEXITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL REALITY: UNCERTAINTY AND 
THE NEED TO RETHINK MANAGEMENT AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF INVESTMENT CAPITALISM 
133 (2d ed. 2010). 
 66  See id. at 64. 
 67  LARS SKYTTNER, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES, PRACTICE 
296 (2005). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
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a system “transforms itself into states of higher order” in an effort to 
create structure.70 
4.  Uncertainty and Unpredictability 
Though self-organizing behavior does lead to the development 
of discernible patterns and structure within complex adaptive 
systems, this property, like all others previously explored, makes it 
virtually impossible to “understand or predict the behavior of a 
complex adaptive system with much accuracy.”71  Given the 
complexity of these systems, as well as their ability to adapt through 
various emergent processes, when one “[c]hange[s] the network 
architecture,” one likely “set[s] in motion . . . changes throughout” 
the entire system.72 
This has significant consequences for those attempting to assess 
the impact of human intervention upon a complex adaptive system.  
Not only might small interactions produce monumental changes, but 
they may also lead to drastic and deleterious unintended 
consequences.  Put differently, “small misjudgments about the 
system’s dynamics have the potential to produce wildly inaccurate 
predictions of the system’s trajectory over time.”73  Moreover, even if 
perfect prescience were possible at the time of intervention, the 
nonlinearity of these systems, as well as their adaptive capacity, makes 
predictions based on initial conditions somewhat irrelevant, because 
the systems are likely to change in response to the interaction.74 
In sum, “it is simply not possible to unravel the tangled strands 
of . . . complex adaptive systems . . . and snip with surgical precision 
the undesirable causal chains.”75  This does not mean, though, that an 
understanding of these systems and their properties serves no utility.  
On the contrary, this Article submits, as other have before, that it 
would be “worthwhile if [lawmakers] and the courts understood [the 
properties of complex adaptive systems] well enough to consider 
their possible consequences in their decision making.”76  This is 
especially true in the field of national security law, where the two 
complex systems of law and war meet. 
 
 70  Id. at 294.  
 71  Pierre de Vries, The Resilience Principles: A Framework for New ICT Governance, 9 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 137, 157 (2011). 
 72  Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 893. 
 73  J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in 
the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 89 (2010).  
 74  See DUHÉ, supra note 46, at 59–60. 
 75  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 73, at 89. 
 76  Jones, supra note 24, at 878. 
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B.  The Legal System and War as Interdependent Complex Adaptive 
Systems 
As is evident from the discussion in the previous section, 
complex adaptive systems theory emerged primarily within the realm 
of the natural sciences.  Since its development, though, the theory 
has found traction in other fields of study, including, among 
numerous others, “ecology, economics, human physiology as well as 
human social and organizational systems.”77  That said, “[m]aking the 
jump from physical and biological systems to social systems has seen 
controversy for the obvious reason that humans are the intentional 
designers of social systems.”78  Stated differently, whereas natural 
forces are not conscious of their surrounding networks, people are; 
and people also are capable, based on this understanding, of altering 
their behavior in an effort to manipulate system changes.79  
Nevertheless, “people have long appreciated that they are part of 
social systems and that remarkable system properties emerge from 
their collective interactions” in ways that are often not anticipated.80  
Accordingly, the fact that humans either have created, or are a part 
of, a system does not diminish the important insights to be gained 
from thinking of those systems through the lens of complex adaptive 
systems theory. 
1.  The Legal System as a Complex Adaptive System 
As explained above, much of the complexity associated with 
complex adaptive systems derives from the fact that these systems are 
comprised of various interrelated and interdependent agents or 
components.  So it is with the legal system.  Most fundamentally, 
although “the law” is generally discussed in the United States as if it 
were a single unified canon, it is in fact composed of various nested 
complex systems, including those of the common law, statutes, and 
the Constitution.81  While each of these parts certainly forms the 
whole, they are also independently in a state of constant flux as law is 
created, interpreted, and applied.82  Importantly, as each evolves, the 
impact is felt not only in the context of the particular component 
 
 77  Glenda H. Eoyang, Human Systems Dynamics: Competencies in a Complex World, in 
PRACTICING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE FOR CONSULTANTS 541 (William J. 
Rothwell & Roland L. Sullivan eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 78  Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 896–97. 
 79  See id. at 897. 
 80  Id. 
 81  See Telecommunications Economy, supra note 18, at 383. 
 82  See id. 
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part, but also within the legal system as a whole. 
More broadly, the legal system also exhibits attributes of a 
complex system by virtue of its various nested institutional 
components, their internal dynamism, and their interrelationships.  
Few have difficulty accepting, for example, the idea that the law itself 
is something that is constantly undergoing an evolutionary process.83  
This is most clear, perhaps, within the context of judicial 
interpretation and its effect on the ever-changing body of common 
law.  But even “[t]he process of legal change and aggregate judicial 
decision-making is undoubtedly impacted by actors, institutions and 
social forces exogenous to the judicial branch.”84  The legislature, for 
one, “is a separate and distinct, albeit interrelated, complex adaptive 
system apart from the judiciary.”85  Throughout history, the judiciary’s 
actions have had significant effect on statutory construction, and vice 
versa.86  Likewise, the authority of the executive branch over the 
administrative state, as well as its power to issue executive orders and 
implement policy, further adds to the complexity inherent in the 
legal system.  These “interconnected layer[s] of actors and 
institutions . . . collectively generate the canon,” and together work 
toward a form of self-organization, bringing structure and order to 
the legal system.87 
Yet, as with other complex adaptive systems, the legal system 
cannot be fully understood solely by examining either the nature or 
the activities of its component parts.  On the contrary, the complexity 
of the legal system, as the sum of its parts, is exacerbated by the 
interaction and adaptation occurring within its agents and 
subsystems.  In other words, the evolution of the whole occurs 
because “its components (e.g., laws, judges, defendants, witnesses) 
change with time.  Statutory revisions and emendations, the 
emergence of new case law, and changes in court personnel are 
several relevant and significant examples” of the legal system’s 
dynamic properties.88  Agents within the legal system, like those 
 
 83  See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, Policy and Science: A Review Essay of Wilson’s 
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, 44 S.D. L. REV. 612, 626 (1999); Daniel M. Katz et 
al., Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the “Evolution” of the Law: Toward a Positive 
Theory of Judicial Social Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 980–83 (2008). 
 84  Katz, supra note 83, at 1000. 
 85  Telecommunications Economy, supra note 18, at 383. 
 86  A simple example of this is evident in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  In 
holding there that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, the Court “sound[ed] the 
death knell for nearly 200 . . . statutory provisions.”  Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting). 
 87  Katz, supra note 83, at  980. 
 88  CHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND JUSTICE: 
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within other systems, also “learn from experience and adapt to 
changes in the system’s environment.”89  Indeed, beyond simply 
reacting to external environmental changes, actors and institutions 
also exhibit adaptive behavior in response to the actions of other 
agents and institutions within the system.90 
One illuminating example of this is the process of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation within the U.S. legal system.  Because 
both Congress and the courts share some responsibility for these 
issues, “the judiciary and the legislature . . . engage in a dialogue 
about constitutional meaning . . . and listen to and learn from each 
other’s perspective, modifying their own views accordingly.”91  Of 
course, the executive branch shares similar duties,92 so its activities 
and interpretations can also cause other actors within the legal system 
to change their behavior. 
Those subject to the law similarly adapt their behavior in 
response to the changes taking place in the legal system around 
them.  This may result in such things as changed policies, tactics, or 
even goals.  The important point is that, just as these internal actors 
are learning and adapting as a result of their interactions with one 
another, these dynamic processes are also contributing to the overall 
evolution of the law.93 
This evolution, along with the inherent complexity and 
nonlinearity present within the legal system, creates the 
unpredictability exhibited by all complex adaptive systems.  Again, in 
this context, the contention is not that the law itself is uncertain 
(though it may well be), but rather that changes made to it often lead 
to unpredictable results.  In other words, the various components of 
the legal system “interact in unpredictable ways, clashing with, 
reinforcing, and reacting to each other.  No one actor is in a position 
to sort out these influences.  No one actor takes a grand overview.  
There is no center of command and control.”94  These properties 
 
CHAOS THEORY AND THE NEW (DIS)ORDER 30 (2002). 
 89  Barbara A. Cherry, Maintaining Critical Rules to Enable Sustainable 
Communications Infrastructures, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 953 (2008). 
 90  See Patricia A. Martin, Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the 
Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 320 (1999). 
 91  Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories 
of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1171 (2006). 
 92  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
 93  See Luc B. Tremblay, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue 
between Courts and Legislatures, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 617, 647–48 (2005). 
 94  M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 396 
(2009). 
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make it such that even mere tinkering with the legal system can wreak 
unforeseen havoc.  Indeed, so common is this phenomenon that it 
has its own name: the law of unintended consequences. 
An illustration within the legal system helps demonstrate the 
point.  Judge Colleen McMahon is a federal judge sitting on the 
United Stated District Court for the Southern District of New York.95  
Without using the terminology associated with complex adaptive 
systems, she has nevertheless put her finger on the difficulties 
associated with intervening in complex adaptive systems.  “More than 
a few recent appellate decisions,” she explains, “have brought in their 
wake unanticipated (and, I am sure, unintended) consequences for 
the management of cases in trial courts, to the prejudice of litigants 
and the consternation of the judges who must put the decisions into 
practice.”96  Judge McMahon cites as evidence U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions—”causing no end of practical problems”—related to federal 
sentencing guidelines, public officer qualified immunity, and civil 
pleading standards.97  According to Judge McMahon, the unintended 
consequences to flow from these particular decisions include a lack of 
judicial uniformity, increases in the time required to adjudicate cases, 
and deleterious effects on the judiciary’s case management system.98 
There are other equally instructive examples.  Some observers 
suggest, for example, that stringent sex offender laws often have the 
unforeseen effect of actually making previously non-violent sex 
offenders more dangerous.99  Others note that significant antitrust 
regulation has led to unintended consequences such as higher taxes 
and major delays in the completion of business transactions.100  
Ultimately, these illustrations underscore the argument that, because 
the legal system is complex and adaptive, it is often impossible to 
predict the effect of change on the system.  As with other complex 
adaptive systems, even small inputs can lead to significant and 
unexpected results. 
 
 95  Hon. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 851 n.2 
(2008). 
 96  Id. at 851. 
 97  Id. at 851–52. 
 98  Id. 
 99  When Getting Tough Backfires: Sex Offender Laws Have Unintended Consequences, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 18, 2007), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web 
/2007/06/11/sexoffender1/. 
 100  Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on 
Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust 
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 869 (1997). 
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2.  War as a Complex Adaptive System 
Just as the legal system may properly be viewed as a complex 
adaptive system, so too may warfare.  While complex adaptive systems 
theory is a relatively new concept, recognition of the complexity 
inherent within war certainly is not.  One author suggests, for 
example, that Carl von Clausewitz—in his seminal treatise On War—
recognized “that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, 
the conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be 
analytically predicted.”101  Clausewitz’s understanding of the 
nonlinear properties of war was based on his belief that “war” really is 
a process of interaction between the various components inherent 
within any particular engagement.102  He explained, for instance, that: 
[t]he military machine—the army and everything related to 
it—is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to 
manage.  But we should bear in mind that none of its 
components is of one piece: each part is composed of 
individuals, . . . the least important of whom may chance to 
delay things or somehow make them go wrong. . . .  This 
tremendous [interaction], which cannot, as in mechanics, 
be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with 
chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, 
just because they are largely due to chance.103 
The chaos present within war is compounded by the fact, as 
Clausewitz highlighted, that “[i]n war, the will is directed at an 
animate object that reacts.”104  Though Clausewitz did not use the 
terminology of complex adaptive systems per se, he nevertheless 
understood the importance of interactions taking place between and 
among the competing forces engaged in battle, as well as between 
and among the external forces giving context to the war.  Indeed, he 
surmised that this interaction is the very thing that “is bound to make 
[war] unpredictable.”105  This unpredictability is compounded by the 
nonlinear properties of war, which make it such that “[t]he 
consequences are often disproportionately felt.”106  As Clausewitz 
recognized: 
the scale of a victory does not increase simply at a rate 
 
 101  Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War, 17 INT’L 
SECURITY 59, 61 (1993).   
 102  Id. at 72. 
 103  Id. at 75 (quoting CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119–20 (Michael Howard & 
Peter Paret eds., 1976)).   
 104  Id. at 73 (quoting CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 103, at 149).   
 105  Id. (quoting CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 103, at 139).   
 106  Id. 
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commensurate with the increase in the size of the defeated 
armies, but progressively.  The outcome of a major battle 
has a greater psychological effect on the loser than the 
winner.  This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of 
material strength . . . , which is echoed in loss of morale; the 
two become mutually interactive as each enhances and 
intensifies the other.107 
Clausewitz is not the only military strategist to recognize the 
value of thinking of war as a complex adaptive system.  Military 
leaders throughout history “have sought to organize and direct their 
armies as to best preserve their order and coherence when faced with 
the centrifugal forces of chaos unleashed on the battlefield.”108  In 
order to do so, these leaders have had to contemplate the effects 
flowing from the complex interaction taking place between the many 
components or agents at work within any war, from the actual hostile 
forces, to the weather, terrain, weaponry, and political context in 
which battles are fought.109 
Moreover, beyond the complexity associated within any specific 
component—like all complex adaptive systems—war, as a system, is 
comprised of various nested subsystems.  This nesting takes many 
forms.  For one, “interaction with an enemy always occurs at three 
levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical.  In modern war, 
events at the tactical level can have immediate impact on the strategic 
level,” and vice versa.110  Likewise, as another example, nested within 
the application of military air power is the system of target selection, 
which is based on intelligence, or the process of “analyzing the 
(potential and actual) effects of air power.”111  Though understanding 
any of these subsystems certainly helps to explain the likelihood of 
success for the entire air power system, accurate predictions cannot 
be based solely on an examination of the system’s parts.  This is 
because “[i]ndependently valid intelligence may be invalidated by 
poor targeting or the poor execution of air power.”112  Thus, the 
ultimate successfulness of an air operation is “interdependent and 
 
 107  Id. at 73 (quoting CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 103, at 253).   
 108  Antoine Bousquet, Chaoplexic Warfare or the Future of Military Organization, 84 
INT’L AFF. 915, 918 (2008).  
 109  Id. (citing MARTIN VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR 264 (2003)).  
 110  Justin Kelly & David Kilcullen, Chaos Versus Predictability: A Critique of Effects-
Based Operations, 2 SECURITY CHALLENGES 63, 66 (2006).  
 111  Eric B. Dent & Cameron G. Holt, CAS in War, Bureaucratic Machine in Peace: 
The US Air Force Example, 3 EMERGENCE 90, 98 (2001).  
 112  Id. 
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mutually causal with both intelligence and targeting.”113 
These examples are illustrative of the fact that, like all complex 
adaptive systems, war is made complex partly because of the sheer 
number of interrelated component parts.  This complexity is 
compounded by the fact that these agents and subsystems are 
constantly evolving.  “Like a living organism, a military organization is 
never in a state of stable equilibrium but is instead in a continuous 
state of flux—continuously adjusting to its surroundings.”114  This 
does not mean, however, that the system of war exhibits complete 
disorder.  Rather, emergent processes within the system lead to a 
form of self-organization.  This process was captured by Sun-tzu over 
two centuries ago when he said 
Now an Army may be likened unto water, . . . as water 
shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army 
manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the 
enemy.  And as water has no constant form, there are in war 
no constant conditions. Thus, one able to gain victory by 
modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy 
situation may be said to be divine.115 
Beyond adaptation to an enemy’s situation, in the process of self-
organizing, military forces must also adapt to the changing political 
and legal environment within which war is executed.  It is with this in 
mind that the interdependence and interaction between the legal 
system and the system of war assumes its importance.  Simply put, 
when viewed as either a subsystem of war or, even less drastically, as 
an interdependent system evolving in conjunction with it, it becomes 
clear that changes within the legal system to the laws governing war 
may have significant and unpredictable consequences on military 
operations.  The rise in targeted killing is arguably one example of 
this phenomenon.  Before this argument can be further advanced, 
however, it is necessary to take a brief detour to explore the 
environment within which the executive is currently operating as it 




 113  Id. at 99. 
 114  U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMAND AND CONTROL (MARINE CORPS DOCTRINAL 
PUBLICATION 6) 46 (1996). 
 115  SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 101 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963). 
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III.  THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT’S 
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION POLICIES 
Days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
overwhelmingly adopted the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), which granted the President authority “to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks.”116  Because the AUMF did not specifically detail the 
process for detaining or interrogating those engaged in terrorism 
against the United States, the executive was largely free, at least 
initially, to craft its own procedures.  This Part briefly explores the 
evolution of those procedures, especially those pertaining to 
detention and interrogation of hostile parties captured during the 
war on terror.117  The aim of this discussion is to provide the 
background necessary to support the assertion that targeted killing 
has emerged as an unintended response to changes in these policies. 
A.  Legal Framework for Detentions 
Almost immediately after the events of September 11th, the 
Bush Administration determined that the attacks perpetrated against 
the United States necessitated a military response.  As part of this 
military campaign, by the end of 2001, the United States and its allies 
had captured nearly seven thousand suspected al Qaeda and Taliban 
members in Afghanistan.118  While it was not immediately clear what 
the government would do with these alleged terrorists, even senior 
legal advisors to President George W. Bush believed that “[t]he law of 
armed conflict provide[d] the most appropriate legal framework for 
 
 116  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 117  It is not the purpose of this Article to provide a comprehensive overview of 
these subjects, but rather to explain them sufficiently to provide context for the 
argument that the growing dearth in detention options was part of the emergent 
process that led to the rise in targeted killing.  Readers seeking more information 
about the government’s detention or enhanced interrogation policies should see 
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
(2006); Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263 (2004); 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 671 (2005); Jordan J. Praust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate 
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 811 (2005). 
 118  Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the 
Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541, 544 (2004). 
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regulating the use of force in the war on terrorism.”119 
It is easy to understand why this would be the case.  Scholars 
widely recognize that the law of armed conflict, largely codified in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949,120 provides the “gold standard 
regarding the capture, detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners of 
war and civilian internees.”121  Under the Conventions, a party’s rights 
and duties in connection with a captured individual are based upon 
the legal status of the detainee.122  Depending on the degree and 
legitimacy of a captive’s involvement in hostilities, the law of armed 
conflict dictates that a captive be designated a lawful combatant, 
unlawful combatant, or civilian.123 
The importance of this categorization process cannot be 
overemphasized, since designation as a lawful combatant entitles a 
detainee to special privileges and classification as an unlawful 
combatant conversely limits a detainee’s rights.  For instance, the 
Third Geneva Convention grants a lawful combatant “[i]n an armed 
conflict between two or more parties to the . . . Conventions” favored 
 
 119  William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 320 (2003).  Taft served as Legal Adviser to the U.S. 
Department of State during the Bush Administration.  Id. at 319 n.d1. 
 120  Another significant aspect of the law of war not explored here is customary 
international law.  For more information about its application within the war on 
terror, see Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 929–33 (2007). 
 121  Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmare from the 
War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1211 (2007).   
 122  See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]; PHILIP BOBBITT, 
TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 265 (2008); Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1242 
(2005). 
 123  Lawful combatants are: (1) “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict;” (2) “[m]embers of other militias and . . . volunteer corps . . . belonging to a 
Party to the conflict” who also are “commanded by a person responsible for 
subordinates,” wear distinctive insignia, “carry arms openly,” and operate “in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war;” (3) “[m]embers of regular armed 
forces who profess allegiance to a government  or an authority not recognized” by 
the opposing belligerent; or (4) “[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on 
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms.” Geneva Conventions, supra 
note 122, at art. 4.  Unlawful combatants are those with no right to engage in 
hostilities, while civilians are those persons who take no direct participation.  
O’Connell, supra note 122, at 1242 (citations omitted).  The designations of lawful 
and unlawful combatant are used for simplicity, though it is worth noting that there 
is some dispute over the legitimacy of the term “unlawful combatant.”  See, e.g., 
Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that the phrase “‘unlawful enemy combatant’ does not 
constitute a term of art in the mainstream law of war,” and that “[i]t does not 
appear . . . in any of the major law or war treaties”).  
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legal treatment as a prisoner of war (POW).124  There are many 
benefits to being classified as a POW rather than an unlawful 
belligerent.  POWs, for example, “are traditionally immune from 
criminal prosecution for war-like acts that comply with the laws and 
customs of war.”125  By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ex 
parte Quirin that “[u]nlawful combatants are . . . subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.”126 
In a conventional conflict, properly classifying a captive as a 
civilian, lawful combatant, or unlawful combatant usually is not 
difficult.  Given the atypical nature of the war on terror, however, this 
classification process arguably presented novel difficulties that 
required a nuanced approach.  In arriving at that approach, the Bush 
Administration initially rejected altogether the application of the 
Conventions to the war, and therefore operated under the 
assumption that no captive was entitled to POW status.127  After this 
position was widely criticized,128 President Bush reversed course and 
adopted the view that the “Conventions would apply to the conflict 
and to the Taliban detainees, but not to Al Qaeda—and that neither 
the Taliban nor Al Qaeda would be granted prisoner-of-war status.”129  
This seemingly contradictory position was grounded on the argument 
that, while the Taliban at least purported to constitute the 
government of Afghanistan, “alleged members of al Qaeda, whether 
rounded up in Afghanistan or elsewhere, were considered members 
of a rogue, stateless international terrorist organization.”130  As such, 
 
 124  O’Connell, supra note 122, at 1242–43. 
 125  Mark David Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: Status, 
Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 21 (2007).   
 126  317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).  Military commissions are tribunals, operated by officers 
in the armed forces, which are designed primarily to be conducted in times of war to 
prosecute those who engage in war crimes.  Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, 
Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1079, 1117–18 (2008).  Given the context within which these tribunals are 
conducted, persons subject to their jurisdiction are afforded fewer procedural 
protections than are normally available in civilian trials or courts-martial.  See Edward 
F. Sherman, Terrorist Detainee Policies: Can the Constitutional and International Law 
Principles of the Boumediene Precedents Survive Political Pressures?, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 207, 210 (2010). 
 127  See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Behind-
the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2002, at A1. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id.; see also Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating 
to International Law: General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 820, 820–24 (2004).  
 130  Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The 
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because al Qaeda, unlike the Taliban, had not been a signatory to the 
Geneva Conventions, the Bush Administration argued that the 
organization’s members were not entitled to their protections.131  As 
for denying the Taliban POW status, the government based its view 
on the fact that Taliban members failed to comply with certain 
conditions required by the Conventions for such status, including 
conducting military operations in accord with the rules of law, 
wearing distinctive uniforms, and the like.132 
This denial of POW status by fiat struck many observers as 
improper,133 especially in light of provisions within the Geneva 
Conventions regarding the measures that must be taken in the face of 
ambiguity about a captive’s legal status.  In particular, Article 5 of the 
Third Geneva Convention dictates that, should there be doubt as to 
whether captives are entitled to POW status, the detaining power 
must grant those detainees the privileges of POWs “until such time as 
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”134  In 
response to calls to hold these Article 5 hearings, however, the Bush 
Administration responded that “[t]he President—the highest 
‘competent authority’ on the subject—has conclusively determined 
that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees . . . do not qualify for POW 
privileges.”135 
Given the executive’s adamancy on this point, some have argued 
that the Bush Administration “took a maximalist position” in 
determining how detainees would be classified.136  Indeed, rather 
than classifying hostile forces as either lawful or unlawful combatants, 
the government began instead to designate all detainees as “unlawful 
enemy combatant[s]”137—a designation that, as one scholar argues, 
 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 306 (2008). 
 131  See Roberto Iraola, Enemy Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56 OKLA. 
L. REV. 565, 579–80 (2003) (noting the position of the Bush Administration that 
“[m]embers of al Qaeda’s terrorist network . . . are not covered by the Geneva 
Conventions because that network was not a party to the signed accords”). 
 132  See Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 
(Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB 
/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.  
 133  See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying 
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1264 (2002).  
 134  Geneva Conventions, supra note 122, at art. 5. 
 135  Brief for Respondents at 24, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696), 2004 WL 724020. 
 136  David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 727 (2009). 
 137  What precisely the Bush Administration meant by this designation was not 
initially clear.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (“There is some 
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“plunges an individual into a legal limbo relieved by few rights.”138 
By classifying detainees as unlawful enemy combatants, the U.S. 
government signaled its belief “that the detainees were not protected 
by the Geneva Conventions,” and that they “therefore could be 
subjected to harsh coercive interrogations.”139  Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court had expressed in Ex parte Quirin, designating captives 
as unlawful enemy combatants also triggered “jurisdiction of the 
military commissions established to try detainees for alleged 
violations of the laws of war.”140  Importantly, these military 
commissions initially lacked a number of procedural safeguards 
typical of most civilian trials or even courts-martial: the commissions 
used evidence obtained via “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
interrogation methods”; admitted hearsay statements; penalized a 
detainee for refusing to testify; and limited a detainee’s ability to 
choose his own counsel.141 
 
debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never provided 
any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”).  The 
term was later clarified to include, among others, a captive who “was part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United Stated or its coalition partners.”  Memorandum for 
Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Sec’y of Def. 
for Policy, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Notice to Detainees, July 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures 
.pdf.  In any event, the category of “unlawful enemy combatant” has been challenged 
as one that “did not and does not exist under international law.”  Peter Jan 
Honigsberg, Chasing “Enemy Combatants” and Circumventing International Law: A License 
for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 4 (2007) (noting also that, 
“[p]rior to 9/11, there were only two universally recognized categories of 
combatants: lawful and unlawful”); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: 
Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1730–31 (2009) 
(“International humanitarian law distinguishes between lawful and unlawful 
belligerents . . . [but the] Bush Administration’s use of ‘enemy combatant’ at times 
conflated both categories, and at other times seemed to create a third.”). 
 138  Danner, supra note 123, at 3. 
 139  Cole, supra note 136, at 727; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–
30 (2006) (setting forth the government’s position that the Conventions were 
inapplicable because al Qaeda was not a signatory to them).   
 140  Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Obama Administration’s First Year 
and IHL: A Pragmatist Reclaims the High Ground, 12 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 
263, 270 (2009).  The decision to subject detainees to military commissions had been 
approved by President Bush in a Military Order issued in November of 2001.  
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  In issuing the Order, the President 
cited authority vested in him “as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Id. 
 141  See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on National 
Security (May 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-national-security-5-21-09. 
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In realistic terms, these circumstances effectively created a 
situation in which detainees were in a legal black hole.  First, there 
was no mechanism by which they could challenge their classification 
by President Bush as unlawful enemy combatants.  Second, for those 
charged with violating the laws of war, President Bush had declared 
in a military order that “military tribunals shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction.”142  In other words, the executive purported to strip 
Article III courts of jurisdiction to provide detainees any legal relief.  
The lack of opportunities available to detainees to challenge their 
continued captivity was seemingly compounded by the fact that, by 
January of 2002, the government had begun transporting them to the 
isolated naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 
Like most decisions associated with the prosecution of the war 
on terror, the choice of Guantánamo Bay as a locale for a detention 
center was not accidental.  “Viewing the very extension of judicial 
process to alleged terrorists as a national security threat,”143 the Bush 
Administration had sought a location that would be “beyond the 
reach of American courts.”144  As such, every locale that seriously was 
considered during the search process was outside the United States.145  
Eventually, the Department of Defense proposed the U.S. Naval Base 
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, given that the isolation of the base 
protected it “from the prying eyes of other countries.”146  The issue 
finally was settled, perhaps, after the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
in responding to the question of whether U.S. courts would be able 
to exercise authority over detainees at Guantánamo Bay, concluded 
“that the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal 
district court could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an 
alien detained [there].”147 
Given the Bush Administration’s position that Guantánamo Bay 
was beyond the reach of U.S. courts, it seemed like an ideal location 
 
 142  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833  § 7(b)(1) (Nov. 13, 2001) (emphasis added).   
 143  Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an 
Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 244, 248 (2010). 
 144  Sherman, supra note 126, at 208. 
 145  Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2004, at A1.   
 146  Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L. 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 455 (2005).   
 147  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y 
Gens., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 
(Dec. 28, 2001)). 
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for detaining terrorists.  Beyond serving as a detention facility, 
however, the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay gradually 
assumed an additional purpose that would eventually engender much 
controversy.  For not only were U.S. personnel at Guantánamo Bay 
charged with detaining enemy combatants, they were also given the 
added mission of “creating and operating an intelligence collection 
program to exploit those detainees.”148  “As proved to be the case at 
Abu Ghraib, mixing two separate and distinct missions at one 
detention facility can blur the lines of command and control and 
generate tensions and adverse consequences.”149  This was especially 
true given the Administration’s approval of interrogation techniques 
thought by many observers to amount to torture.150 
B.  Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 
John Yoo, a former OLC attorney and one of the chief legal 
architects of the Bush Administration’s detention and interrogation 
policies, has said that “[m]ilitary detention is . . . one of our most 
important sources of intelligence, which in turn is our most 
important tool in [the war on terror].  We . . . need to know who [the 
enemies] are, where they are, who is helping them, and what they are 
planning, which . . . require[s] . . . interrogation of captured enemy 
combatants.”151  In March of 2002, U.S. personnel captured a senior al 
Qaeda operative named Abu Zubaydah and began the interrogation 
process in an effort to answer some of those questions.152  Initially, the 
interrogation went well, with Zubaydah providing significant amounts 
of actionable intelligence, including the names of other senior al 
Qaeda members and details concerning the organization’s 
operational plans.153  Officials eventually “[grew] frustrated with the 
interrogation” process, however, after Zubaydah stopped 
cooperating.154 
 
 148  Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the High-
Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 119 (2009).  Morris formerly served as 
Chief Prosecutor for the Military Commissions at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  Id. at 115. 
 149  Id.  
 150  See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 
2022 (2008) (noting “that everyone but the Bush administration regards” enhanced 
interrogation techniques “as torture or cruel and degrading treatment”). 
 151  YOO, supra note 117, at 151.  
 152  See David Johnston et al., Nominee Gave Advice to C.I.A. on Torture Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 153  CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, REPORT ON THE CIA INTERROGATION OF ABU 
ZUBAYDAH 1–2 (2001–2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA 
_Interrogation_of_AZ_released_04-15-10.pdf.  
 154  Clark, supra note 146, at 456. 
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It was this frustration that opened what President Obama would 
later call a “dark and painful chapter in [American] history.”155  In 
light of Zubaydah’s uncooperativeness in the face of standard 
interrogation techniques, in the summer of 2002, U.S. interrogators 
sought approval from the Justice Department to use harsher tactics 
while questioning him and other high-value detainees.156  Of primary 
concern to them was whether harsher practices would be compatible 
with the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT)—an international 
treaty the United States has signed—and the related federal statute 
implementing the treaty’s obligations.157  To resolve this issue, White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez enlisted OLC,158 which quickly 
released what subsequently became known as the “torture memos.”159 
From the outset, OLC’s analysis seemed designed to “eliminate 
any hurdles posed by the torture law[s].”160  On August 1, 2002, the 
office released a memo, written by John Yoo and signed by Assistant 
Attorney General Jay Bybee,161 concluding that the CAT and its 
related statute “prohibit[] only the most extreme acts,” and “that for 
an act to constitute torture . . . it must inflict pain . . . equivalent in 
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as 
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”162  
Mental distress had a similarly high threshold.  The memo indicated 
that, to qualify as torture, mental pain had to be so severe that it 
caused “suffering not just at the moment of infliction,” but also 
“lasting psychological harm.”163  OLC further suggested that even this 
 
 155  Statement, President Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-
President-Barack-Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos/.   
 156  Clark, supra note 146, at 456–57. 
 157  Id.; see also United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006).  
 158  Clark, supra note 146, at 457. 
 159  See Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 389, 
392 (2010). 
 160  OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 160 (quoting Jack 
Goldsmith, former OLC director). 
 161  See id. at 1. 
 162  Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee-
Gonzales Memo], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127 
/02.08.01.pdf.  OLC’s standard as to what constituted torture was not based on any 
common understanding of this term, but rather on “a Medicare statute setting out 
the conditions under which hospitals must provide emergency medical care.”  Clark, 
supra note 146, at 459. 
 163  Bybee-Gonzales Memo, supra note 162, at 46. 
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narrow ban on torture only applied if the consequence of pain was 
specifically intended, and not if it occurred as a result of an 
interrogator’s attempt to elicit information necessary for national 
defense.164  As the final salvo, in contemplating the constitutionality of 
the federal law purporting to prevent torture, OLC concluded that it, 
and any other effort “by Congress to regulate the interrogation of 
battlefield combatants[,] would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting 
of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.”165 
Though this memo, during drafting, was known within OLC as 
the “bad things opinion,”166 the worst was yet to come.  A second OLC 
memo, issued on August 1, 2002, provided vivid substance to the 
comparatively antiseptic definition of torture contained in OLC’s first 
opinion.  In particular, the second memo addressed the legitimacy of 
using various interrogation tactics against detainees like Abu 
Zubaydah, including “(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, 
(4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall 
standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed 
in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.”167  Ultimately, OLC 
concluded that none of the proposed interrogation procedures 
would violate the ban on torture, as none would “inflict severe 
physical pain or suffering,” nor was there any evidence that the 
techniques would “produce[] any prolonged mental harm.”168  Based 
on this analysis, in the months following the opinion’s release, U.S. 
interrogators waterboarded Zubaydah and another senior al Qaeda 
operative hundreds of times.169 
C.  The Evolution of the Government’s Detention Policies 
Though the procedural deprivations stripping war on terror 
captives of basic rights were instituted in a matter of months, their 
repudiation took significantly longer.  “Given the difficulty of second-
 
 164  Scharf, supra note 159, at 398; see also Bybee-Gonzales Memo, supra note 162, 
at 42–46. 
 165  Bybee-Gonzales Memo, supra note 162, at 39. 
 166  OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 7, at 46. 
 167  Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al 
Qaeda Operative, 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee-Rizzo Memo], available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/OfficeofLegalCounsel_Aug2 
Memo_041609.pdf.  These tactics are described in detail throughout the memo.  
 168  Id. at 18, 11, 16. 
 169  Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 
2009, at A1. 
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guessing the government’s initial risk assessment,”170 the U.S. 
Supreme Court initially “operated mostly on the margins of the 
nation’s War on Terror policy.”171  Similarly, in part because they 
remained largely classified, the enhanced interrogation techniques 
approved on the basis of OLC’s analysis were only haltingly 
renounced.  Eventually, however, “in recognition of a changing 
political climate,” both the Court and the new executive 
administration took an increasingly aggressive approach to 
redefining the rights of detainees.172 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Habeas Cases 
From 2004 to 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided four cases 
that significantly eroded the powers claimed by President Bush in 
relation to war on terror detentions.  In the first, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
the Court purported to “answer only the narrow question” of whether 
persons like Yaser Hamdi—a U.S. citizen captured in a combat zone 
and held in the United States—could be detained by the President as 
part of the war on terror.173  Although, as explained earlier, the Bush 
Administration believed that Article II vested the President with the 
ability to detain enemy combatants during times of war, the Court 
chose not to resolve that issue.174  Instead, it held that, because the 
AUMF authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against” those involved in the September 11th attacks,175 and 
since detentions were fundamentally incident to war-making, 
Congress had implicitly authorized the executive to engage in 
detention operations when it enacted the AUMF.176  Though this 
aspect of the case essentially amounted to a victory for the 
government, perhaps more significant was the battle it lost. 
While concluding that the executive had authority to detain 
enemy combatants, the Hamdi Court also held that “due process 
demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy 
 
 170  Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 555, 555 (2005). 
 171  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: 
An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 352 (2010). 
 172  Id. 
 173  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).  At the time, Hamdi was 
detained not at Guantánamo Bay, but rather in a military brig in South Carolina.  Id. 
at 510. 
 174  Id. at 517 (stating that the opinion did “not reach the question whether Article 
II provides such authority”). 
 175  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 176  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
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combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual 
basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”177  This 
holding was a direct rejection of President Bush’s attempts to 
unilaterally and “conclusively determine[] that [all] al Qaeda and 
Taliban” members were indeed subject to detention.178  Instead, the 
Court signaled to the government that it would thenceforth be 
required to fashion procedures that would provide captives of U.S. 
citizenship with (at least) a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge 
their legal status. 
Just days after the Court released the Hamdi opinion, the 
Department of Defense responded by creating Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which were specifically tasked with the 
mission of “determin[ing], in a fact-based proceeding, whether the 
individuals detained by the Department of Defense at the U.S. Naval 
Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, [were] properly classified as enemy 
combatants.”179  Although the procedural burden these hearings 
placed on the government were minimal,180 the larger issue is that the 
Bush Administration did not have “the slightest interest in fixing this 
problem” in the first place, because it simply did not view it as a 
problem.181 
The same day the Court issued the Hamdi opinion, it also 
established in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts had jurisdiction, under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241, to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions filed by non-
U.S. citizens held at Guantánamo Bay.182  In dissent, Justice Scalia 
highlighted, as outlined above, that, in shaping the government’s 
detention policies, “[t]he Commander in Chief and his subordinates 
 
 177  Id. at 509. 
 178  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 179  Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the 
Navy (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memo], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; Sherman, supra note 
126, at 213; see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 700 (2009). 
 180  See Wolfowitz Memo, supra note 179; Carla Crandall, Ready. . .Fire. . .Aim!: A 
Case for Applying American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. 55, 77 (2012). 
 181  Editorial, Guilty Until Confirmed Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/opinion/15sun1.html.  As is evident from the 
title of this editorial, many observers viewed the procedural protections purported to 
exist in the CSRTs as a sham.  See also Debate, Hamdan and the Military Commissions, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 146, 159 (2007). 
 182  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 485 (2004).  Some have argued that the 
holding of Rasul was actually much broader.  See Fallon, supra note 171, at 356 
(“Rasul intimated that the federal courts’ authority to issue the writ on behalf of 
noncitizen detainees might extend around the world to Iraq and Afghanistan, 
among other places.”). 
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had every reason to expect that the internment of combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing the 
cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military 
affairs.”183  Justice Scalia also issued a “dire warning” that the decision 
would wreak havoc, unforeseeable at the time, on the executive’s 
ability to wage war.184  Indeed, after Rasul, a flood of “alien detainees 
at Guantanamo quickly pressed habeas petitions in U.S. courts.”185 
Both the legislature and executive quickly responded to this 
changed environment.  For its part, the executive decided that all 
detainees—not just U.S. citizens—would undergo an enemy 
combatant status determination before a CSRT.186  Meanwhile, 
Congress enacted legislation, called the Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA), which essentially overruled Rasul by statutorily stripping 
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by foreign 
nationals detained at Guantánamo Bay.187 
The constitutionality of the DTA served as the basis of the next 
Supreme Court case related to war on terror detentions.  In Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the DTA’s jurisdiction stripping 
provision did not apply to cases, like the one then before it, that 
already were pending at the time the legislation was enacted.188  As 
significantly, the Court also determined that the military 
commissions, as constituted under the direction of President Bush, 
were improper forums for trying detainees.189  The Court’s rationale 
was that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) “conditions 
the President’s use of military commissions on compliance not only 
with the American common law of war, but also with the rest of the 
UCMJ itself . . . and with the rules and precepts of the law of 
nations.”190  These rules had been violated, the Court concluded, 
because both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions afforded 
detainees more process than war on terror detainees were entitled to 
under the government’s version of military commissions.191  Once 
again, the Court’s ruling was seen by most observers as an express 
repudiation of the government’s detention policies. 
 
 183  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 184  Id. at 498–99. 
 185  See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 179, at 700. 
 186  See id. 
 187  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 188  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 582–84 (2006). 
 189  Id. at 612–13. 
 190  Id. at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 191  Sherman, supra note 126, at 216. 
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Yet again, however, Congress reacted to the Court’s decision 
with great haste.  Just four months after release of the Hamdan 
opinion, the legislature passed the Military Commissions Act 
(MCA).192  Beyond expressly authorizing the military commissions 
established by the executive to try war on terror detainees, the MCA 
also clarified that federal courts were statutorily barred from hearing 
any habeas petition filed by a Guantánamo Bay detainee, no matter 
when that petition had been filed.193  Once more, the enactment of 
the MCA was an indication that the political branches were in 
lockstep as to the appropriate approach to take in dealing with war 
on terror detainees.  But again, the Supreme Court found that 
approach improper. 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court extended constitutional habeas 
rights to individuals confined at Guantánamo Bay.194  In so doing, it 
also made clear that Congress’s attempt under the MCA to strip 
federal courts of the power to hear habeas cases “operate[d] as an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ” of habeas corpus.195  Though 
the Court explicitly noted that it made “no judgment whether the 
CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards,”196 it 
also stated that the procedures contained therein were “not an 
adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.”197  As with Rasul, 
the Boumediene decision sparked a flood of subsequent litigation, 
much of which further eroded the authority of the executive in 
connection with war on terror detentions.198 
Though the Supreme Court has faced intense criticism for not 
being aggressive enough in responding to perceived executive 
 
 192  Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2008)). 
 193  Id. 
 194  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
 195  Id. at 733. 
 196  Id. at 785. 
 197  Id. at 733. 
 198  See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting “the government’s suggestion that its mere ‘certification’—that the 
information redacted from the version of the return provided to a detainee’s counsel 
‘do[es] not support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant’—
is sufficient to establish that the information is not material”); Mattan v. Obama, 618 
F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the AUMF only granted the President 
“authority to detain individuals who are ‘part of’ Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated 
enemy forces,” not those who merely “support” those forces); Mohamed v. Gates, 624 
F.Supp.2d 40, 44 (D.D.C. 2009) (requiring the government to divulge statements 
made by detainees if it intends to rely on those statements to justify a detainee’s 
continued incarceration). 
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overreach during the war on terror,199 the four cases of Hamdi, Rasul, 
Hamdan, and Boumediene “have had the effect—which was almost 
surely intended—of unsettling the status quo ante by giving notice to 
the Executive Branch that its detention policies are not immune from 
judicial scrutiny.”200  Detainees have responded to this signal by 
pressing litigation in lower courts with the goal of answering some of 
the substantive questions left unresolved after Boumediene.201  “The 
result has been a kind of ‘percolating’ process through which 
challenges to executive practices that are initially advanced in the 
lower federal courts draw public attention and, what is more, lay the 
foundation for future appeals to the Supreme Court.”202  In this way, 
the Court has ensured its continued involvement in shaping the 
executive’s detention policies.203 
2.  The End of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 
While the Supreme Court has played a relatively significant role 
in defining the contours of the executive’s detention authority, it has 
been virtually silent as to the legitimacy of its interrogation practices.  
Others familiar with the government’s policies have not, of course, 
been equally quiet.  As early as October of 2003, officials within the 
Bush Administration internally began to criticize the torture memos 
as “legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone, and 
overbroad.”204  When the memos were leaked to the press in the 
summer of 2004, the analysis contained in them unleashed a similar 
wave of criticism—and not just from those who supposedly did not 
understand the stakes.  For example, James Woolsey, a former 
Director of the CIA, commented that “[w]e do not live in the 14th 
century, when an outlaw was treated like a wild beast.  The 
president’s need for wise counsel is not well served by arguments that 
 
 199  See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the 
Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 897 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has been too passive, missing opportunities to identify limits on the government’s 
authority in a number of cases of equal—or even greater—significance than the 
Guantánamo litigation.”). 
 200  Fallon, supra note 171, at 392. 
 201  One of the most significant is “whether the [Boumediene] majority’s reasoning 
extends to noncitizens held by the United Stated in foreign territory over which the 
United States does not exercise the complete and permanent de facto authority that 
it has over Guantanamo Bay.”  Fallon, supra note 171, at 382. 
 202  Id. at 392. 
 203  Id. 
 204  JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 151 (2007). 
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bend and twist to avoid any legal restrictions.”205 
In light of these views, OLC gradually “either withdrew or 
cautioned against reliance on a number of [its] opinions.”206  
Meanwhile, as mentioned, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment 
Act (DTA), which, while purporting to strip federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear detainees’ habeas petitions, at least barred the 
use of harsh interrogation techniques against most captives.207  Even 
this change, however, was not wholesale.  “To avoid the President’s 
threatened veto, the Detainee Treatment legislation was revised 
before enactment to exempt the CIA from its requirements.”208  
Accordingly, after the law’s enactment, “the interrogations of high-
level al Qaeda operatives were moved under the control of the 
CIA.”209  All the while, President Bush continued to maintain that his 
Administration was in strict compliance with international and 
domestic laws banning torture.  “The United States does not torture,” 
he said in 2006, “[i]t’s against our laws and it’s against our values.”210 
It would take a changing of the guard to remove all remnants of 
torture from the government’s arsenal.211  On January 22, 2009, just 
two days after he assumed office, Barack Obama issued an executive 
order prohibiting the use of enhanced interrogation techniques.212  
Himself an attorney, President Obama called OLC’s memos “legally 
flawed,”213 and stated that they “undermine[d] our moral 
authority.”214  Indicating that his national security strategy would be 
built on the principle that “[t]he United States is a nation of laws,” 
President Obama stated that his Administration would “always act . . . 
with an unshakeable commitment to our ideals.”215 
 
 205  Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 
2004, at A10. 
 206  OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra  note 7, at 28. 
 207  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 208  Scharf, supra note 159, at 404 n.77. 
 209  Id. at 405. 
 210  See Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 
2009, at A1 (quoting a September 6, 2006 speech given by President Bush).  
 211  Scharf, supra note 159, at 407–08. 
 212  Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 9. 
 213  Press Release, The White House, News Conference by the President (Apr. 29, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-
president-4292009. 
 214  Press Release, The White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on 
Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-
Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos/. 
 215  Id. 
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IV.  COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THEORY AND THE RISE OF THE DRONE 
The foregoing discussion makes clear that it would be impossible 
to prove that the changes made to the complex adaptive systems of law 
and war caused an increase in the number of targeted killings.  But, as 
one legal scholar has suggested, proof “is not the test to which the 
usefulness of complex adaptive systems theory should be put.  Rather, 
it should suffice to show . . . that if we think of the law as a complex 
adaptive system, we are better at designing law as a system.”216  This is 
especially true in the field of national security law, where “system 
design” is often a matter of life and death. 
With that in mind, this Part seeks to demonstrate that targeted 
killing represents a form of self-organizing behavior that emerged as 
the complex adaptive systems of law and war adapted to the changes 
introduced into these systems as the government’s detention policies 
evolved.  The purpose is not to express normative judgment about 
detention, interrogation, or even targeted killing, but rather to 
establish why it is important for policymakers, lawmakers, and judges 
to understand and consider the properties of the complex adaptive 
systems in which they operate, so that they may better appreciate the 
potential consequences of their decisions. 
A.  Targeted Killing: A Primer 
As defined here, targeted killing is the “extra-judicial, 
premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified person not 
in its custody.”217  Though there are numerous mechanisms by which 
such operations might be carried out, the United States has largely 
pursued its recent targeted killing strategy with the use of armed 
drones.218  To be sure, the United States has employed drones since 
the infancy of the war on terror; reports indicate, for instance, that 
on the very evening of the Afghanistan invasion, the United States 
used a Predator drone to reconnoiter Taliban leader Mullah Omar.219  
That said, commentators widely acknowledge that in recent years, the 
use of drones to carry out targeted killings has increased 
exponentially.220 
 
 216  Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 901. 
 217  Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of 
Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 406 (2009). 
 218  See Rebecca Grant, An Air War Like No Other, AIR FORCE MAG., Nov.  2002, at 30, 
34.   
 219  See Seymour M. Hersh, Seymour Hersh: King’s Ransom-How Vulnerable are the 
Saudi Royals?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001, at 35, 35. 
 220  See, e.g., Cooper & Landler, supra note 12, at A1; Bergen & Tiedemann, supra 
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Given this recent expansion, drone warfare largely has been 
associated with President Obama.  Indeed, as one reporter explained, 
“no president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of 
individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.”221  Yet, while it is 
certainly true that targeted killing via drones has increased 
significantly under the Obama Administration,222 the escalation 
actually began in the summer of 2008 when—just one month after the 
Boumediene decision—President Bush issued an “order that 
dramatically expanded the scope of Predator drone strikes against 
militants . . . .”223  During the remainder of 2008, the number of 
drone attacks conducted in Pakistan alone “vastly exceed[ed] the 
number of strikes over the prior four years combined.”224 
As noted, this escalation has continued under the Obama 
Administration.  Reports indicate, for instance, that between 2009 
and 2010, the number of drone strikes in Pakistan more than 
doubled—from 54 in 2009, to 122 in 2010.225  Although this number 
has since been in decline (73 such attacks took place in 2011, while 
48 occurred in 2012), the current rate still significantly outpaces that 
 
note 12 (“Obama, far from curtailing the drone program he inherited from 
President George W. Bush, has instead dramatically increased the number of U.S. 
Predator and Reaper drone strikes.”). 
 221  Greg Miller, Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatus for Drone Killing, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 27, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-
security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/ 
gIQANPdILP_story.html. 
 222  See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert 
Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, 40. 
 223  Ken Dilanian, Incoming House Intelligence Chairman Pushed for Drone Strikes, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/20/nation 
/la-na-rogers-20101221. 
 224  Robert Chesney, Examining the Evidence of a Detention-Drone Strike 
Tradeoff, LAWFARE (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10 
/examining-the-evidence-of-a-detention-drone-strike-tradeoff/.  Chesney raises doubt 
in his post “that the number of drone strikes tells us much about a potential 
detention/targeting tradeoff . . . .”  Id.  His primary rationale is that “[m]ost if not all 
of the difference in drone strike rates can be accounted for by specific policy 
decisions relating to the quantity of drones available for these missions, [and] the 
locations in Pakistan where drones have been permitted to operate . . . .”  Id.  While 
this might explain the increased use of drones in Pakistan, it does not explain the 
expansion of the program in other geographic areas, nor does it explain the 
willingness of the President to target Americans.  See infra notes 227–33.  Chesney 
seems to acknowledge this, and suggests that areas outside Pakistan warrant greater 
scrutiny in terms of examining “killing versus capturing.”  Chesney, supra. 
 225  The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013, 
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
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seen pre-Boumediene.226  Beyond this quantitative increase in drone use 
during President Obama’s tenure, there has also been an equally 
important qualitative expansion.  In 2011, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that “[t]he U.S. military is deploying a new force of armed 
drones to eastern Africa in an escalation of its campaign to strike 
militant targets in the region and expand intelligence on 
extremists.”227  This new arsenal is expected to support the recent 
trend of expanding the geographic scope of drone warfare farther 
away from America’s ground wars.228  More strikingly, in September of 
2011, government officials confirmed that a Hellfire missile launched 
from a CIA drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.229  While news of a 
targeted killing carried out in Yemen might have been noteworthy in 
itself, 230 even more remarkable was the fact that al-Awlaki was a U.S. 
citizen.231  The strike was thus evidence of another expansion in 
drone warfare, permitting attacks even against Americans who, 
though alleged to have been involved in terrorists operations, had 
not been afforded traditional due process protections.232 
To be sure, there are a number of possible explanations for this 
expanded use of drones to carry out targeted killings.  First, in recent 
years, drones undoubtedly have become more sophisticated in terms 
of their capabilities.  This is especially true as pertaining to their 
payload capacity and target recognition features.233  The burgeoning 
 
 226  See id. 
 227  Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Expands Drone Flights to Take Aim at East Africa, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 21, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119041 
06704576583012923076634.html. 
 228  See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands Its Drone War Into Somalia, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1 (reporting the increased use of drones not only in 
Somalia, but also in Yemen). 
 229  See Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. 
 230  But see James Risen, Man Believed Slain in Yemen Tied by U.S. to Buffalo Cell, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A17 (noting the first publicly-disclosed drone attack in 
Yemen, which occurred in 2002). 
 231  See Scott Shane, Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2009, at A1. 
 232  See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2011, at A1.  The government has argued that al-Awlaki’s killing complied 
“with domestic and international law” because he was “engaged in terrorist activity 
outside this country.”  John B. Bellinger, III, Will Drone Strikes Become Obama’s 
Guantanamo?, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/opinions/will-drone-strikes-become-obamas-guantanamo/2011/09/30 
/gIQA0ReIGL_story.html.  Nevertheless, “[s]ome human rights groups have asserted 
that due process requires prior judicial review before killing an American . . . .”).  Id. 
 233  See Andrew Callum, Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, INT’L AFF. REV., 
Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144 (discussing advances in 
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use of drones also may have been triggered by the withdrawal of 
ground troops from areas where targeted killing has more recently 
been pursued.234  In that vein, some have intimated that the rise in 
drone use is a factor of the growing hesitancy to place American 
troops in harm’s way on a battlefield.235  Finally, some have suggested 
that drone use is more prevalent now because, as a tactical strategy, 
targeted killing is simply more effective in the asymmetrical, global 
war on terror.236 
While these explanations are certainly plausible, even granting 
that these factors have contributed to the rise in drone use does not 
exclude the possibility that the strategy actually constitutes a form of 
self-organization emerging from the complex properties inherent 
within the systems of law and war.  Indeed, while not using this 
language, many commentators are beginning to acknowledge the 
correlation between the expanded use of drones and the fact that the 
executive no longer has a comprehensive detention strategy.237  As 
one senior military official has stated, “[w]hen you don’t have a 
detention policy,” operational tactics have to change.238  Indeed, the 
fact is that since the Supreme Court decided Boumediene in 2008, 
there have been few reports of the United States capturing high-value 
targets.239  This reality may well indicate that efforts to grant detainees 
more rights have instead instigated an unforeseen and unintended 
shift away from capture and toward targeted killing. 
 
the armaments and optics of drones). 
 234  See Mayer, supra note 222, at 38.  This argument is belied, though, by the fact 
that many drone attacks take place in Pakistan, a place not known to have U.S. 
ground troops.  See Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 12.  But see Chesney, supra note 
224. 
 235  See KENNETH M. KNISKERN, MAJOR, U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF 
COLLEGE, THE NEED FOR A USAF UAV CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 3 (2006), available at 
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2006/acsc/kniskern.pdf.  
 236  See Chesney, supra note 224.  Chesney argues, for instance, that drone use in 
Pakistan is necessitated by the fact that American troops cannot be placed on the 
ground there.  
 237  DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 13, at A01. 
 238  Id.; see also David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. May Expand Use of Its Prison 
in Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/21/world/la-fg-afghan-prison21-2010mar21 
(“In one case last year, U.S. special operations forces killed an Al Qaeda-linked 
suspect . . . in southern Somalia rather than trying to capture him, a U.S. official said.  
Officials had debated trying to take him alive but decided against doing so in part 
because of uncertainty over where to hold him, the official added.”). 
 239  See DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 13, at A01. 
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B.  Complexity, Adaptability, Self-Organization, and Unpredictability: 
Like Squeezing Jell-O 
In 2009, former OLC director Jack Goldsmith discussed the 
growing “shell game” taking place regarding war on terror detentions 
and explained that, when one military tactic becomes unavailable, 
other strategies emerge to take its place240: 
Demands to raise legal standards for terrorist suspects in 
one arena often lead to compensating tactics in another 
arena that leave suspects (and, sometimes, innocent 
civilians) worse off. . . .  [C]losing Guantanamo or bringing 
American justice there does not end the problem of 
terrorist detention.  It simply causes the government to 
address the problem in different ways.  A little-noticed 
consequence of elevating standards at Guantanamo is that 
the government has sent very few terrorist suspects there in 
recent years. . . .  [T]he Bush and Obama administrations 
have relied more on other tactics. . . .  [T]hey have 
increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that 
eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists 
but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists 
and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.241 
Using language strikingly reminiscent of terminology employed 
by complex adaptive systems theorists, one legal scholar, Kenneth 
Anderson, said of Goldsmith’s commentary that “[o]ne way you 
might look at this is that there is a sort-of national security constant 
that remains in equilibrium over time, using one tactic or another, 
gradually evolving but representing over time a reversion to the 
national security mean.”242  More colloquially, Anderson suggested 
“that national security, seen over time, looks like squeezing [Jell-O]—
if squeezed one place it pops out another.”243  Complex adaptive 
systems theory provides a model for explaining how and why this 
process occurs. 
 
 240  Jack Goldsmith, The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogations, WASH. POST, May 
31, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html?hpid=opinionsbox1. 
 241  Id.; see also Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
22, 2007, at A15 (“[O]ne unintended outcome of a Supreme Court ruling exercising 
jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees may be that, in the future, capture of 
terrorism suspects will be foregone in favor of killing them.”). 
 242  Kenneth Anderson, Security Issues Like Squeezing Jello? Reversion to the Mean? Jack 
Goldsmith on the Effects of Security Alternatives, OPINIO JURIS (May 31, 2009), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/05/31/security-issues-like-squeezing-jello-reversion-to-
the-mean-jack-goldsmith-on-the-effects-of-security-alternatives/. 
 243  Id. 
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Throughout the war on terror, national security law has 
exhibited many properties of a complex adaptive system.  For 
example, as outlined above, the various interdependent agents that 
were involved in shaping the government’s detention policies—
namely, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the Supreme Court—
created part of the complexity inherent within the system.  Not only 
did these agents constitute dynamic systems themselves, as 
significantly, they each had important nested subsystems, such as 
OLC, individual pieces of legislation, and the ideological positions of 
each particular Supreme Court justice.  As U.S. detention policy 
developed, these components of the legal system interacted not only 
with each other, but also with interdependent external systems like 
the American public and the military troops who were actually 
prosecuting the war. 
As this interaction took place, and as the war effort progressed, 
the legal system’s internal agents each learned from one another, as 
well as from the events occurring around them.  This led to a process 
whereby the legal system as a whole evolved, but also whereby each 
agent within the system was forced to “react to what law [was] doing 
to them.”244  Moreover, as alluded to above, because the components of 
the legal system are humans, and therefore possess the ability to 
“steer” the system, they were able during the war on terror to “devise 
ways to influence [other] actors in the legal system.”245 
The complex and adaptive properties inherent within the 
systems of war and law were perhaps most starkly evident in the 
behavior these systems exhibited as the Supreme Court adjudicated 
the habeas cases.  With its Hamdi decision, for example, the Court 
signaled to the executive that it would be required to take a more 
deliberative approach to detainee issues than it had theretofore 
pursued.246  In particular, Hamdi explained that “although Congress 
authorized the detention of combatants . . . due process demands 
that a citizen . . . held as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention.”247  
Though many observers viewed the Court’s “input” as significant,248 
 
 244  J.B. Ruhl, Is the Law a Complex Adaptive System?: The Simply Complex Law, 
JURISDYNAMICS (July 25, 2006), http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/07/is-law-
complex-adaptive-system.html (emphasis added). 
 245  Id. 
 246  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  Indeed, the Court had explicitly 
stated that “a state of war is not a blank check.”  Id. at 536. 
 247  Id. at 509. 
 248  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 73, 73 (2005) (explaining that, in Hamdi and Rasul, “the 
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and therefore expected a linearly momentous effect, the Court’s 
opinion actually caused only a small change in “outcome.”  More 
specifically, the executive adapted to the Court’s input by issuing a 
directive establishing the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs), which provided only minimal additional protections to 
detainees.249 
Likewise, “[a]t the urging of President Bush, Congress 
responded to the Court’s Rasul decision by passing the . . . DTA, 
which repealed the habeas statute for Guantanamo detainees and 
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas cases.”250  This 
activity on the part of the government’s political branches 
represented not only an adaptation to the Rasul opinion, but also an 
effort by those agents to cause the Court, in turn, to adapt.  Again, 
while the executive and legislature might have thought this would 
have the significant effect of keeping the Court out of further 
detention-related issues, the Court instead responded unexpectedly.  
In particular, in Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did 
not apply to cases like the one before it, which had been pending 
when the law was enacted.251  The Court injected further dynamism 
into the system by holding that the military commissions created 
under President Bush’s direction did not provide adequate process to 
those being tried for war crimes.252 
Again, the political branches adapted by enacting legislation, 
this time in the form of the Military Commissions Act (MCA).  The 
MCA, which purported to authorize the tribunals established by 
President Bush, “was a direct response to Hamdan’s holding.”253  
Unlike the DTA, however, the enactment of the MCA seemed 
especially sound, given feedback provided in Hamdan that “[n]othing 
prevent[ed] the President from returning to Congress to seek the 
authority he believes necessary.”254  Though President Bush had done 
just that in requesting enactment of the DTA, the Boumediene Court 
 
Supreme Court emphatically upheld the rule of law and the right of those being 
detained as part of the war on terrorism to have access to the courts”); Fred Barbash, 
Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in Terror Cases, WASH. POST, June 28, 2004, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11657-2004Jun28.html. 
 249  See supra note 181. 
 250  ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, “RESTORING HABEAS CORPUS: AN ANALYSIS OF BOUMEDIENE V. 
BUSH,” available at http://www.afj.org/assets/resources/cases/boumediene-
analysis.pdf (emphasis removed).  
 251  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 583–84 (2006). 
 252  Id. at 634. 
 253  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). 
 254  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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nevertheless would once again reject executive and congressional 
attempts to deal with detainee issues. 
The Boumediene decision arguably provides the starkest evidence 
that detainee policies were being created within a complex adaptive 
system.  This is seen most prominently in the Court’s explicit 
recognition of the feedback loops and evolution taking place within 
the system.  It acknowledged, for instance, “the litigation history that 
prompted Congress to enact the MCA.”255  Boumediene recognized, in 
other words, that enactment of the MCA had been an adaptive 
behavior on Congress’s part to the system input previously provided 
in Hamdan.  Moreover, Boumediene also highlighted the Court’s view 
that there were benefits to be had in “facilitat[ing] a dialogue 
between Congress and the Court,” and it stressed that “ongoing 
dialogue between and among the branches of Government is to be 
respected.”256  For all these indications that the process was to be 
collaborative, however, the Boumediene opinion represented yet 
another defeat for the political branches in their effort to establish 
policies to govern war on terror detentions. 
In light of the perception that the Supreme Court continually 
“threw up barriers to . . . detention policies,”257 the shift in strategy to 
targeted killing may be seen as a form of self-organizing behavior 
within the complex adaptive system of national security law.  This 
assertion is supported by the fact, as other scholars have noted, that 
the agents within the systems likely realized that the Court evidently 
was willing to operate only “at the margins of the United States’s War 
on Terror policy.”258  In other words, despite the legal issues 
implicated by other war on terror practices—particularly the 
government’s interrogation techniques—the Supreme Court limited 
its intervention “to cases arising from physical detention of terrorist 
suspects in the absence of judicial trial.”259  Because this signaled to 
the executive that the Court was unlikely to assert authority to hear 
cases seeking to “redress the deprivations of liberty and property” 
occurring in areas in close proximity to actual battlefields,260 the 
system arguably moved toward the order implicitly associated with 
engaging in targeted killing.  Or, “[t]o put the point more vividly, the 
government [learned that it] could have shot, bombed, or killed any 
 
 255  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 738. 
 256  Id. 
 257  Sherman, supra note 126, at 208. 
 258  Fallon, supra note 171, at 367. 
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. at 368. 
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or all of the Guantanamo detainees whose cases appeared to present 
the most urgent justiciable issues arising from the War on Terror 
without confronting any judicially enforceable restraints.”261 
Similarly, targeted killing also may have emerged as a means of 
self-organization in conjunction with the rejection of enhanced 
interrogation techniques.  Though, as noted above, most observers 
would classify the tactics pursued under President Bush as torture, 
some argue that the Obama Administration has gone to the other 
extreme—instating interrogation policies that have totally neutered 
the process of any effectiveness.262  Under President Obama, 
personnel within the Justice Department have reported, for example, 
that interrogators have “pulled in [their] claws” because they are “not 
going to defend [themselves] in terms of using interrogation 
techniques to acquire intelligence information that goes beyond 
[what President Obama has authorized], even though the law would 
permit it.”263  Although “dead terrorists tell no tales,”264 some argue 
that the rise in targeted killing has emerged in the midst of an 
already declining utility in interrogation.265  Further, the debacle 
surrounding the government’s use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques has created a situation whereby 
the disincentive to capture and instead kill by standoff 
missile strike . . . [is] reinforced by the strong desire—not 
just at the national policy level but also by midlevel people 
intensely concerned for down-the-road, backward-looking 
changes in the rules on . . . interrogation . . . that might 
burn them later on—not to hold anyone if at all possible.266 
In other words, based on the view that it is better to kill than torture, 
the system’s agents perhaps have maladapted toward a preference for 
targeted killing. 
Though in discussing these issues commentators have not 
described the increase in targeted killings as a form of self-organizing 
behavior per se, they at least conceptually have recognized that the 
practice has emerged as a means of achieving order within the 
complex system of national security law.  One scholar has suggested, 
 
 261  Id. 
 262  See, e.g., MARC A. THIESSEN, COURTING DISASTER: HOW THE CIA KEPT AMERICA 
SAFE AND HOW BARACK OBAMA IS  INVITING THE NEXT ATTACK 209 (2010). 
 263  Id. 
 264  Marc A. Thiessen, Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales, FOR. POL’Y, Feb. 8, 2010, 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/08/dead_terrorists_tell 
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 265  Id. 
 266  Anderson, supra note 242. 
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for example, that the Obama “[A]dministration’s opposition to 
Guantánamo and to enhanced interrogation has led it to see even 
more clearly the convenience of taking the fight to the enemies’ 
homes and hideouts and killing them before they come within the 
purview of the U.S. justice system.”267  In this way, the expansion of 
the drone program has resulted from what has been called a 
“‘balloon effect’ in national security law,” which is to say that it has 
emerged “as the result of squeezing out what many experts . . . regard 
as effective wartime domestic policies, such as those permitting 
detention at Guantánamo and enhanced interrogation techniques.”268 
Whether this behavior is described with the imagery of 
squeezing a balloon or squeezing Jell-O, the reality may be that these 
adaptations toward equilibrium within the realm of national security 
are representative of the property of self-organization that is inherent 
in all complex adaptive systems.  To the extent this is true, as 
Professor Anderson alluded to, targeted killing may simply have 
“popped out” as a result of the “squeeze” being placed on the 
government’s detention policies.269  Stated differently, the increase in 
targeted killing via drones arguably has emerged as an unintended 
consequence of efforts to grant detainees greater rights. 
Of course while this might suggest that humans have no control 
over system behaviors, it is worth repeating that humans can 
influence system outcomes.  This, however, evidently is not what has 
happened with targeted killing, as “senior administration officials say 
that no policy determination has been made to emphasize kills over 
captures.”270  Rather, the expanded use of drones seems to have 
occurred without the deliberative decision-making process one would 
hope to see as the United States engages in such practices.  In other 
words, the rise of the drone, and the government’s emphasis on 
targeted killing, perhaps is simply an archetypical example of the law 
of unintended consequences wreaking havoc on the co-evolving 
complex adaptive systems of war and law. 
C.  The Implications of Thinking of War & Law as Co-Evolving 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
One of the primary objections to importing complex adaptive 
systems theory into legal studies seems to be that, because the theory 
accepts that the legal system is chaotic and unpredictable, its 
 
 267  Ofek, supra note 13, at 37. 
 268  Id. at 44. 
 269  See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 270  DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 13, at A01. 
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application necessarily fails to explain how to prevent unintended 
consequences like the rise in targeted killing.271  This critique is 
certainly not without merit, as acknowledging that the law is a 
complex adaptive system does indeed require coming to terms with 
the fact that it is plagued with relentless uncertainty.  However, “in 
social systems, change very often is the specific intent of human 
intervention, in which case knowing how the system responds to 
change should be an important factor in the design of the instrument 
of change.”272 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the changes made to 
the government’s detention policies plainly were the result of human 
intervention.  The failure to consider how the complex systems of war 
and law operate, however, perhaps led to results antithetical to the 
desired outcome of providing greater protections to alleged terrorists 
detained by the U.S. government.  This is not meant to suggest that 
future intervention should consequently be avoided, but rather to 
demonstrate that “[t]he great lesson of [complex] systems theory for 
law reform . . . is that it is the system that counts as much as the rules, 
and that we cannot effectively change only one variable of that 
equation and expect the others to remain static.”273 
This reality has found particular salience in the context of 
environmental law, where efforts at legal reform in the 1970s 
“produced puzzling outcomes.”274  In particular, though the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) and Clean Air Act (CAA) reduced “end-of-pipe” 
pollutants, regulators later learned “that what was no longer coming 
out the pipes was going into the ground instead.”275  The problem was 
that while “[t]he CWA and CAA made sense for the discrete issues 
they were designed to solve, . . . their rigid, single focus approach did 
not anticipate the emergence of lax land disposal practices in 
response.”276 
Similarly, those who have sought to provide greater protections 
to alleged terrorists have typically focused their efforts on discrete 
issues such as closing Guantánamo Bay, pressing for detainee access 
to Article III courts, and ending the practice of enhanced 
interrogation techniques.  Complex adaptive systems theory suggests, 
 
 271  See Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System, supra note 47, at 
1001. 
 272  Law’s Complexity, supra note 16, at 901. 
 273  Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 14, at 916.   
 274  Id. at 882.  
 275  Id. at 882–83.   
 276  Id. at 883.  
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however, that if the ultimate goal is to protect the civil liberties of 
alleged terrorists, these strategies are likely to fail, insofar as they are 
executed with the expectation that other system variables will remain 
static.  While accurately predicting and responding to potential 
consequences that may flow from these changes is not entirely 
possible given the complex properties of the systems that are 
involved, the mere recognition that such a process is necessary makes 
it far more likely that desired outcomes will be reached. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the U.S. government was cleansing the “embarrassing 
stain” created by its detention policies,277 few took note that U.S. 
drone strikes were simultaneously killing “twice as many suspected al-
Qaeda and Taliban members [as] were ever imprisoned in 
Guantanamo Bay.”278  Among those who have noticed this trend, 
there is growing sentiment that targeted killing is even more 
pernicious than torture, and that it has become “Obama’s 
Guantanamo.”279  Though these arguments are worthy of further 
debate, this Article demonstrates the importance to that debate of 
properly understanding the environment from which national 
security policy emerges. 
Targeted killing did not simply emerge ex nihilo as a preferred 
strategy by which to prosecute the war on terror.  Rather, when law 
and war are analyzed through the lens of complex adaptive systems 
theory, an argument emerges that the government’s drone program 
is instead a form of unanticipated self-organization arrived at as a 
result of continuous adaptation to various inputs injected into these 
systems.  Stated differently, it may well be that the government’s 
expanded use of drones arose as an unexpected and unintended 
consequence of prior efforts to grant detainees greater civil liberties. 
To the degree that complex adaptive systems theory does in fact 
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help to explain the rise of the government’s drone program, the 
theory serves as more than a retrospective analytical tool.  More 
importantly, though it will always be impossible to accurately predict 
with complete precision the result of intervention into a complex 
system, the mere recognition that the systems in which they operate 
are complex will undoubtedly aid policymakers, lawmakers and judges 
in appreciating the potential consequences of their decision-making 
processes. 
 
